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ABSTRACT
Law and technology matters have traditionally been researched in
discrete categories such as intellectual property (e.g., copyright,
patent, or trademark) or intermediary liability and responsibility (e.g.,
secondary liability and telecommunications regulation). In the last
two decades, however, academics have studied the broader
interaction between law and technology across legal fields. This
Article examines progress to date and discusses two distinct
perspectives on law and technology.
The dominant approach has been an instrumentalist one that treats
technology as a tool for individuals to use while downplaying its
broader social implications. However, the fields of philosophy of
technology, science and technology studies, and social studies of
science are now mature enough to support a rival approach grounded
in a deep understanding of the nature-rather than the results-of
technological change. This substantivist approach suggests analytical
principles to refine and improve technology law and policy in ways
that rival, instrumentalist approaches have neglected. For instance,
substantivist commitments support a law and technology construct
called a "digital persona" to emphasize the needfor laws and policies
to promote autonomy within the online world. By contrasting
instrumentalist and substantivist approaches, we demonstrate new
ways to integrate ethics, policy, and law in the digital age.
* Frank Pasquale is Professor of Law at the University of Maryland, an
Affiliate Fellow of the Yale Information Society Project, and a fellow of Vermont
Law School's New Economy Law Center. Arthur Cockfield is a Professor with
Queen's University Faculty of Law, Canada. We wish to thank participants in a
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between law and technology has traditionally
been scrutinized in discrete categories such as intellectual property
(e.g., copyright, patents, or trademarks) or intermediary liability and
responsibility (e.g., secondary liability and telecommunications
regulation). By studying law and technology issues as matters that
should be relegated to such conceptually sealed boxes, legal
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scholarship has sometimes promoted a body of doctrine that is
unfinished and inadequately informed.
For example, consider the extraordinary rise of legal immunities
for online intermediaries. In the case of Internet companies, Google
and Facebook have serially won key copyright, trademark, and
antitrust cases. In the U.S., Google and Facebook have asserted free
expression immunities when sued for business torts, and they have
avoided classification as a "consumer reporting agency" under
relevant privacy laws, despite employers' and bankers' use of them to
assess reliability and creditworthiness of applicants., Each of these
decisions may have been correct as a matter of law.
But what happens when a critical mass of close cases combines
with network effects to give a few firms incredible power over our
personal information about events, commerce, potential friends and
soulmates, and more? What happens when these few firms and online
social networks turn personal data against users themselves? What
happens when foreign forces use the platforms built by these firms to
influence elections by microtargeting users based on their own
personal data? What happens when individuals' real lives are
increasingly interwoven with their digital personhood and hence they
increasingly suffer discrimination via unfair social sorting? Legal-
academic culture is very good at analysis but oft adrift when it comes
to synthesis. Specialization obscures the larger context. Authorities
around the world are now struggling with this problem, and scholars
are searching for a more holistic perspective on technology law and
policy.2
These questions are all the more urgent now that some
technologists bill smart contracts, block chains, and other forms of
automation as ways of replacing law with technology.3 The composite
movements of #legaltech, #fintech, #regtech, and #insurtech have
raised the stakes of regulation of new technologies. No longer is the
1. See Section IV.C and accompanying notes.
2. For a discussion of similar themes, see generally Kieran Tranter,
Nomology, Ontology, and Phenomenology ofLaw and Technology, 8 MINN. J.L. Sci.
& TECH. 449 (2007); Sanya Burgess, Big Tech Companies Threaten Our Democracy,
Warns EU Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, NAT'L (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://www.thenational.ae/business/technology/big-tech-companies-threaten-our-
democracy-wams-eu-commissioner-margrethe-vestager- 1.673711
[https://perma.cc/8NGK-BJNS]; Nitasha Tiku, Al Franken Just Gave the Speech Big
Tech Has Been Dreading, WIRED (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/al-
franken-just-gave-the-speech-big-tech-has-been-dreading/ [https://perma.cc/DL4V-
WMS2].
3. Examining the Innovative Technologies Being Used To Change the Way
Financial Services are Provided and the Financial System Operates, 115th Cong. 66,
76 (2017) (citing a statement from Professor Frank Pasquale).
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question one of degree: How much should law and policy attempt to
channel, limit, or encourage the development and dissemination of a
technology? Rather, technology may usurp critical aspects of law,
policy, and trusted institutions. Taken too far, the vertiginous
possibility here is a demand that law itself submit to the dictates of
technological development rather than encoding and enacting the
values meant to shape technology.
Two paths of the field of law and technology illuminate how we
have come to this impasse and how we might escape from it. An
instrumentalist literature tends to consider both law and technology as
means to ends: Technologies should be adopted as long as they
promote an instrumental purpose that enhances efficiency.4
A rival approach models each as constitutive of certain social
domains-that is, not merely one of many ways to order such domains
but as critically affirming or distorting the ways in which human
participants in a social order conceive of themselves and their
activity5 We call such an approach substantivist to contrast it with the
instrumentalist school.
Instrumentalism's main tools of analysis are methodologically
individualistic social sciences, such as economics and psychology.
Instrumentalism focuses on individual disputes and fits more naturally
with court cases that are both retrospective and specific.
Substantivism, by contrast, draws on more holistic disciplines such as
political science, philosophy, social theory, anthropology, and
sociology. It reflects the broader, more substantive impacts of
technology on individuals and their communities, including political
and social perspectives.
Unsurprisingly, instrumentalism is dominant in the Western
world. However, its dominance is not necessarily founded on it being
a better approach than substantivism. The fields of philosophy of
technology, science and technology studies, and social studies of
science are now mature enough to support a canonical set of
approaches to recurrent regulatory and legal dilemmas. Substantivism
also fits better with administrative rulemaking processes, which are by
nature polycentric and prospective. Such holistic thinking is necessary
in order to preserve human values in a legitimate way in an
increasingly technologized world.
4. See ANDREW FEENBERG, TRANSFORMING TECHNOLOGY: A CRITICAL
THEORY REVISITED 5 (2002) (describing the instrumentalist theory of the relationship
between law and technology).
5. See id. at 6-7 (describing an alternative view of the relationship and
purpose of law and technology).
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To support this claim, we explore how a substantivist vision of
law and technology constructs and protects what can increasingly be
called our digital persona, a broader notion than the normal focus on,
say, digital identity within privacy law. A digital persona is essentially
an online avatar of a real person whose life is interwoven within the
digital world. Personhood is the self, and our minds are a mirror of
how we are treated, including how our digital persona is treated.6
At this juncture in time, the online world is at a turning point.
Will it continue to allow powerful forces of commerce, domestic and
foreign governments, and malignant individuals to track us,
discriminate against us, shape our thinking, and undermine our
democratic institutions? Or will the online world free us of earthly
structure so that the digital persona can travel on its journey relatively
unmolested by these forces? The substantivist perspective of law and
technology shows how law and policy can advance the latter goal. The
digital persona model helps to understand the need for a conceptual
shift away from the normally reactive focus on protecting identity
(e.g., privacy laws that try to inhibit what third parties know about us)
to a more proactive effort to protect our minds from manipulation or
excessive influence as we navigate the online world.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I discusses historical
approaches to studying law and technology, as well as how these
approaches fail to illuminate important policy considerations in many
circumstances. Part II describes how cyberlaw writings provided a
first attempt by legal scholars to critically examine the broader
relationship between law and technology, while nevertheless being
rooted in a primarily instrumental vision of this relationship. Part III
discusses how a substantivist perspective of technology can better
identify critical policy concerns in a world increasingly mediated by
complex technologies. Further, Part III reviews the different theories
and perspectives supporting instrumentalism and substantivism as
well as recent social scientific analysis of technological determinism.
Part IV revisits cyberlaw analysis from a substantivist perspective,
sets out our model based on the digital persona, and provides a case
study of free expression online in the age of bots to show how this
perspective can illuminate under-explored areas of policy concern.
Part V concludes that broader forms of legal analysis, supported by
mature social science theories of technology, can offer insight into
guidelines and analytical frameworks at the intersection of law and
technology.
6. See CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER
183-84 (1902) (discussing how individuals form their personal identity).
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I. LAW AND TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES
Before addressing historical developments surrounding law and
technology, some terminological clarification is in order. Both law and
technology are notoriously contested concepts. For example, a spoon
is a technology for eating, but there have been few, if any, sustained
reflections on cutlery as technology in the past century or so. That is
because in common parlance, our common sense of the technological
carries with it a clarifying sensibility that it usually only makes sense
to apply the term to objects which are relatively new ways of
accomplishing tasks.? Discussing the "Hapi-Fork," a fork that
electronically buzzes once its wielder has eaten a certain number of
bites, under the rubric of technology makes more sense than applying
that category to a fork simpliciter.
While the core of law is better defined than technology, it also
has fuzzy edges. For example, the great legal theorist John Chipman
Gray characterized even a statute as merely a source of law and not
law itself, which was the exclusive province of courts to articulate."
That particular distinction has faded in the past century, as statutes
have become more ubiquitous and detailed, and agencies make policy
judgments in order to clarify statutes. But as any student of U.S.
administrative law knows, the distinction between agency rules with
the force and effect of law and mere guidance or interpretive rules is
not always clear to either courts or the regulated community.9
Nevertheless, such ambiguities do not make law a meaningless or
arbitrary concept. Rather, they should instead caution analysts to be
7. For different views and definitions of technology, see, e.g., EDWARD
TENNER, OUR OWN DEVICES: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF BODY TECHNOLOGY ix (2003).
Tenner discusses the complementary principle of "technique," or how the
modification of the environment is used in performance. See id Changes in behavior
resulting from technology innovations inspires new hardware, which generates more
innovations. See id. He discusses the theories of Jacques Ellul, who argued that
modem human society is so swamped by technologies that technology and technique
are now inseparable. See id. at 4-5. For further discussion of Ellul's views, see infra
Subsection III.A.3. Different academic disciplines have chosen to approach the
somewhat controversial definition of technology in different ways. For example,
Strategic Technology Analysis, as part of a broader management theory, defines
technology as "created competence . . . expressed in technological entities consisting
of devices, procedures, and acquired human skills." Rias J. van Wyk, Technology: A
Fundamental Structure?, 15 KNOWLEDGE TECH. &POL'Y 14, 19 (2002).
8. See generally JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE
LAW (1909). Many thanks to Peter Quint for this reference.
9. See Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Jeff Sessions, Office of the
Attorney Gen. on Prohibition on Improper Guidance Documents (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/press-release/file/10 1227 1/download
[https://perma.cc/4QLZ-UAQ6].
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aware of the multifaceted nature of law before presuming to propound
theories of law tout court. Mindful of the vital role of history and
timing in the definition of technology and the articulation of law, we
introduce in this section emblematic examples of legal systems and
scholars struggling to apply legal principles to new and emerging
technologies.
A. Historical Legal Approaches to Technology
Law has always addressed technological development, since
new modes of life and affordances so often precipitate conflict.
Intellectual property law provides a good example of such struggles.
Before the invention of the printing press, it was relatively laborious
to duplicate and disseminate any particular text. 10 The inefficiency of
hand printing provided a natural limit to the number of copies of any
given work that could be distributed by someone without permission
of the original author. The same logic applied to descriptions of ways
of doing things or new products.
Lawmakers and judges struggled to balance the interests of
inventors who created new technologies against the rights of those
affected by the technologies, ranging from inventors and authors to
copyists and readers to ordinary citizens. In fifteenth-century England,
for instance, the invention of the printing press led to new ways about
thinking of the role of authors and publishers." Shortly after the
invention of the printing press, a concept of individual work began to
spread through society. Technical affordances of widespread copying
and distribution helped generate new ideas of commodification.
By 1493, printers and authors in England and Venice were
asking for exclusive rights to print and disseminate their works, laying
the foundations of copyright law.12 These new rights were
accompanied by the growth of censorship laws as medieval rulers and
church authorities sought to control both the content of printed
manuscripts as well as the content-producers themselves.13 More
recently, while intellectual property law has flourished and grown over
the past century in the West, free expression law has undercut
10. See ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT OF
CHANGE xvi (14th ed. 2009).
11. See Jane C. Ginsburg, "Une Chose Publique"? The Author's Domain
and the Public Domain in Early British, French and US Copyright Law, 65
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 636, 639 (2006).
12. See Martha Buskirk, Commodification as Censor: Copyrights and Fair
Use, 60 OCTOBER 82, 84-88 (1992).
13. See id. at 85.
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censorship as a form of control of information in these same
Socleties.14
From these earlier roots arose the traditional categories of
intellectual property law-patents, copyrights, and trademarks.
Sherman and Bently discuss how these developments were derived
through complex social processes involving business lobbying,
Victorian sensibilities, and judicial misunderstanding of certain
scientific principles.15 Despite this uneven start, the categorization
clearly had a massive influence on subsequent legal developments.16
Later on, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed an
explosion of laws responding to the industrial revolution. Technology
change had provoked a new machine society fueled by the
development of machine production and machine transportation such
as steam engine boats.17 In their wake, different legal innovations were
introduced, including labor laws (in particular the creation of child
labor laws and workplace accident laws), housing policies due to
overcrowded cities, pollution regulation, and "poor laws" (i.e., welfare
laws that sought to provide financial relief to destitute families).
A number of works have reviewed the birth of railroads within
this new machine society and how this innovation provoked legal
changes to accommodate the new forms of transportation and its
required infrastructure.18 The changing laws also sought to account
for, promote, or ignore, the interests of consumers and government-
imposed shipping fees, farmers whose lands were expropriated for
railway passage, and the powerful railroad companies themselves.19
14. See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, THE GROWTH OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
A HISTORY OF THE OWNERSHIP OF IDEAS IN THE UNITED STATES (1999),
https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/77YD-
WFEV].
15. See generally BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF
MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 1760-1911(1999).
16. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual
Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2190 (2000).
17. See Donald G. Gifford, Technological Triggers to Tort Revolutions:
Steam Locomotives, Autonomous Vehicles, and Accident Compensation, J. TORT L.
(forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3090636
[https://perma.cc/YV4L-PNY6]; see also JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL
REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF
AMERICAN LAW 2 (2004).
18. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH
CENTURY 53 (2002); STEVEN W. USSELMAN, REGULATING RAILROAD INNOVATION:
BUSINESS, TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1840-1920, at 382 (2002).
19. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 18; see also USSELMAN, supra note 18
(discussing, from a historical perspective, U.S. government efforts to regulate railway
innovations, including how regulatory decisions reinforced certain interests).
828 2018
Beyond Instrumentalism
As technology became more interwoven with the lives of
individuals and their communities, Western legal norms began to
slowly adapt to these developments. Sherman and Bently further note
that, by the mid- to late-nineteenth century, traditional doctrine could
not properly adapt to technological developments, and English
intellectual property law became more abstract and forward looking
by moving away from a reactive and case specific analysis of the law
surrounding "mental labour."20 In a world increasingly mediated by
complex technologies, we now turn to our claim for the need for an
ongoing evolution toward holistic analysis of the intersection of law
and technology.
B. Blind Spots in Historical Legal Approaches to Technology
Legal responses to both the rise of the printing press and the
industrial revolution bear similar hallmarks. Courts and lawmakers
were largely reactive to technological developments.21 They seemed
reluctant to enact or develop new laws at the introduction of new
technologies, despite the danger that new uses of technologies could
violate public values or destabilize valued social arrangements. Nor
were they keen on setting new laws or developing new ways of
thinking that envisioned the development of related future
technologies.22 As a result, when issues dealing with new technologies
reached legislatures or courts, the lawmakers or judges tended to fit
the new technology into pre-existing categories; these efforts were
later identified by cyberlaw scholars as trying to fit "new wine into old
bottles."23
Legal scholars subject laws to deliberation and review.
However, technological developments that accompany these legal
changes have less frequently been subject to such scrutiny and
challenge. This occurs despite the fact that "[c]hanges in technology
affect people's ability to produce, consume[,] and exchange goods just
20. SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 15, at 6-7.
21. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Towards a Law and Technology Theory, 30
MAN. L.J. 383, 398, 407-09 (2004) (discussing the need for broader theories and
perspectives on law and technology).
22. For discussion, see Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological
Change and Doctrinal Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the
Court, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 976, 1012-15 (1997).
23. See infra notes 66-68 (showing the Easterbrook-Lessig exchange and
how it generated significant discussion, including discussions about cyberlaw
teaching). See, e.g., Marci Wilson, Is Internet Law a Discreet Practice or Just Old
Wine in a New Bottle?, 19 OF COUNSEL, at 9 (Oct. 9, 2000); Renato Mariotti,
Cyberspace in Three Dimensions, 55 SYRACUSE L. REv. 251, 262-63 (2005).
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as surely as a change in laws or regulations."24 Accordingly,
technology change can be subjected to ethical evaluation similar to the
approach within legal analysis.
A more critical examination of the interplay between law and
technology is necessary as technological developments determine
certain paths and influence human behavior, often in unanticipated
ways. 25 As Marshall McLuhan pointed out, "we become what we
behold[;] we shape our tools and afterwards our tools shape us."26 Max
Weber similarly noted that when we surrender our goals and social
practices to technologies, it forms an "iron cage" that restricts efforts
to obtain desired policy objectives.27
As our lives become more entwined with technology,
technology exerts more influence on our values, norms, interests, and
culture.28 Embedded technologies are particularly powerful,
presenting greater resistance to change.29 Improvements in technology
are double edged; some promote social interests by permitting
individuals to enjoy wealthier and healthier lives, but others lead to
socially ambivalent or even disastrous results. Moreover, there is no
obvious final accounting for the balance of harm and help for many
critical technologies. Advances in surveillance technology have
arguably promoted state security, but enhanced surveillance could also
24. PAUL B. THOMPSON, JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ETHICS ISSUES IN
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 123 (2002). Part of this phenomenon is a
consequence of the social acceleration of time, which undermines the effectiveness of
legislative, regulatory, and judicial interventions in many areas. See WILLIAM
SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL ACCELERATION OF TIME 1
(2004).
25. See MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF
MAN 23 (1994).
26. Id. at xxi. McLuhan theorized that media, in the beginning, acts as
extensions of people, but over time people become extensions of media. See id. When
the technology is pushed to its limit, it becomes the driver of social change or the
message itself. See id.
27. LAWRENCE A. SCAFF, FLEEING THE IRON CAGE: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND
MODERNITY IN THE THOUGHT OF MAX WEBER 5 (1989).
28. See, e.g., DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: MONITORING EVERYDAY
LIFE 1-2 (2001); MARK STEFIK, THE INTERNET EDGE: SOCIAL, LEGAL AND
TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES FOR A NETWORKED WORLD 3-4 (1999); MANUEL
CASTELLS, THE POWER OF IDENTITY: THE INFORMATION AGE-ECONOMY, SOCIETY
AND CULTURE 1-2 (1997).
29. See Thomas P. Hughes, Technological Momentum, in DOES
TECHNOLOGY DRIVE HISTORY? THE DILEMMA OF TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM 112
(Merritt Roe Smith & Leo Marx eds., 1994) ("A technological system can be both a
cause and an effect; it can shape or be shaped by society. As they grow larger and
more complex, systems tend to be more shaping of society and less shaped by it.").
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undermine important democratic values like freedom of expression.30
The acceleration of technological development also undermines
society's ability to shape its adaptation to these developments, as they
overwhelm the bottlenecks of legislatures and courts.31
Technology's role in modulating, shaping, and chilling opinion
was not top of mind for those advancing it to deter terrorism or crime.32
But such effects, now reliably documented, should inform future
deployments of surveillance, ranging from gait and iris recognition to
Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID)-chipping. A law-and-
technology perspective or theory can help us to understand the ways
that technological developments can either subvert their own ends,
undermine other policy goals, or transform our understanding of social
realities and relationships. Technology is increasingly interwoven
with our social, political, economic, and cultural fabric. Laws that
respond to (or fail to respond to) technological change will
increasingly have an impact on important values and interests.33
Moreover, the traditional compartmentalization approach may inhibit
progress toward a deeper and more nuanced understanding of law and
technology. Wagner has noted that courts have struggled with limited
success to apply legal precedents to disputes involving emerging
technologies and "[i]n many cases, those law-and-technology issues
that have been addressed have been resolved only partially or
inconclusively."34 Complementing these doctrinal silos, narrow
30. See Frank Pasquale, Paradoxes of Privacy in an Era of Asymmetrical
Social Control, in BIG DATA, CRIME AND SOCIAL CONTROL 31-35 (Ale§ Zavrainik ed.,
2018); see also BERNARD E. HARCOURT, EXPOSED: DESIRE AND DISOBEDIENCE IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 168-69, 175-81 (2015).
31. See HARTMUT ROSA, SOCIAL ACCELERATION: A NEW THEORY OF
MODERNITY 261 (2013) (discussing the challenges to politics and law when
"[i]nnovation cycles (the time between a scientific or technological invention and its
introduction to the market) and product cycles (the lifetime of a given model) have
been accelerated so much in certain sectors (for instance, in entertainment electronics
and, to some extent, even in the automobile industry) that often even the dealer is
unable to identify the most up-to-date product, let alone the consumer").
32. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Surveillance as Law, 20 GRIFFITH L. REv. 795,
801-08 (2011) (discussing how Surveillance Studies assesses, among other things, the
broader social impact of post-9/1 1 government surveillance).
33. This view is consistent with views of observers who assert that
technology developments cannot be separated from social, cultural, economic and
political processes. To a certain extent, this view departs from what has been called
the instrumental theory of technology where technologies should be adopted as long
as they promote an instrumental purpose that enhances efficiency. For discussion, see
ANDREW FEENBERG, CRITICAL THEORY OF TECHNOLOGY 5 (1991).
34. Dana R. Wagner, The Keepers of the Gates: Intellectual Property,
Antitrust, and the Regulatory Implications ofSystems Technology, 51 HASTINGS L.J.
1073, 1075 (2000).
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methodological focuses have also occluded a more holistic
perspective on the interaction between law and technology and their
broader societal impact.35
An alternate emerging approach is to examine the ways that
traditional doctrinal categories of the law-torts, criminal law,
contracts, property-interact with the specific technologies.36 MOre
recent law-and-technology writings are sensitive to the substantive
impact of technology on interests the law has traditionally sought to
protect. 3 7 If technology threatens these interests, these perspectives
sometimes call for judicial approaches that are less deferential to
precedent and legislative empowerment of agencies with flexible and
broad mandates to monitor and channel the development of
technology.
II. THE RISE OF CYBERLAW
Cyberlaw has featured both the instrumentalist and substantivist
approaches to technology. This school began as scholars emphasized
new ways of thinking about the relationship between law and
technology.38 Though instrumentalist approaches have dominated the
field, we will explore how more substantivist approaches have always
been a leitmotif and should become more important as the full
consequences of digitization become more apparent.
The roots of cyberlaw began with a more narrow focus on
computer and telecommunication technologies.39 Laurence Tribe's
Channeling Technology Through Law was a very early casebook on
law and technology.40 In 1971, seven American lawyers formed a
computer law group to study how developments in computer
35. See generally Lyria Bennett Moses, TWhy Have a Theory of Law and
Technological Change?, 8 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 589 (2007).
36. See id. at 594.
37. See infra Section IV.B.
38. See generally PATRICIA L. BELLIA, PAUL S. BERMAN, & DAVID G. POST,
CYBERLAW: PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2d
ed. 2004).
39. We are grateful to Dag Spicer, Senior Curator at the Computer History
Museum in Mountain View, California, for providing us with this background. In July
2017, the Computer History Museum began to curate the historic conference
proceedings of the ITechLaw Association along with selected law and technologyjournals. See COMPUT. LAW Ass'N, GUIDE TO THE COMPUTER LAW ASSOCIATION
RECORDS (1982-2005), http://archive.computerhistory.org/resources/access/text/
finding-aids/102733964-CLA/102733964-CLA.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7DH-7XRJ]
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
40. LAURENCE TRIBE, CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW 5 (1973).
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technologies were interacting with legal developments.41 They
initially started to meet in different East Coast states, and the
organization quickly grew in size. In 1973, the group was incorporated
into the non-profit Computer Law Association (CLA).42 The CLA held
several national and international conferences each year, including its
annual Computer Law Update (later renamed the World Computer and
Internet Law Congress), conducted workshops, and also published
periodicals and reports on computer law.43 As international
membership grew, the CLA changed its name in 2006 to the
International Technology Law Association, or ITechLaw; it continues
to hold conferences around the world and publish related academic
joumals.44
By the mid-1990s, the study of computer law morphed into the
study of "cyberlaw" or "cyberspace law."45 Cyberlaw, which typically
focuses on information technology and Internet developments, was an
early attempt by legal scholars as a group to discuss general principles
and theories surrounding the relationship between law and technology.
A reason for such extensive discussion was the fact that the Internet
merged (within one online forum) seemingly endless forms of social
and commercial interaction, and thus implicated a wide range of laws:
free speech, privacy, contracts, legal jurisdiction, intellectual property,
and many other fields.
In reaction, legal academics struggled to understand how this
complex stew of activities would mesh with law. This Part reviews
two core cyberlaw debates that were carried forward within
subsequent law and technology discussions: whether the Internet and
cyberspace were so new they required entirely new ways about
thinking about the law, and in what situations lawmakers should seek
to regulate code to pursue policy goals.
41. COMPUT. LAW Ass'N, supra note 39.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. In the U.S., for classroom purposes, computer law casebooks were
revised into cyberlaw casebooks. In addition, the first cyberlaw casebook that
grappled exclusively with legal issues surrounding the Internet was published. See
RAYMOND S. R. Ku, MICHELE A. FARBER, & ARTHUR J. COCKFIELD, CYBERSPACE
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2002). The American Association of Law Schools
finally changed the name of its Section on Computer Law to "Internet and Computer
Law."
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A. Is Cyberspace a New Space Requiring New Laws?
Prior to the rise of the Internet, author William Gibson coined
the word "cyberspace" in a short story. 46 In his later novel
Neuromancer, Gibson elaborated on his vision of our future, a world
increasingly mediated by computers: "Cyberspace. A consensual
hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in
every nation .... A graphic representation of data abstracted from the
banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable
complexity."47
Early Internet users who were familiar with Gibson's works
likely adopted the word "cyberspace." As we explore in our discussion
of the digital persona below, Gibson's vision of cyberspace appears
increasingly relevant as virtual reality technologies and haptic suits
progressively allow users to "jack in" to the Internet for a more organic
mental experience. This ongoing complex meshing of real personhood
with digital personhood calls for proactive and holistic legal and
policy protections for the latter, including possible reforms to human
rights law.48
Gibson's dystopian vision of our future and its cyberpunk ethics
likely played well with these early Internet participants who valued
the complete freedom of their online experiences and considered
themselves pioneers in an untamed online universe. For example, John
Perry Barlow adopted the term in his well-known A Declaration ofthe
Independence of Cyberspace, a call to arms against what he viewed as
the unwarranted intrusion of government regulation into Internet
matters. 49 Notably, Barlow's and other early views focused on the need
to protect our minds against outside influence during online
experiences.50 Unfortunately, the common focus on government as the
chief agent of tyranny left many other problems unaddressed.
Barlow's brash libertarianism was rendered obsolete, as it became
clear that spontaneous order is about as rare on the Internet as it is
46. See WILLIAM GuSON, BURNING CHROME 176 (1986).
47. See WILLLAM GuSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (1984).
48. See Lawrence M. Friedman, On Planetary Law, 54 STAN. J. INT'L L. 213,
214, 220 (2018) (discussing how global digital technologies are encouraging a
convergence in human rights laws); see also Marta Poblet & Jonathan Kolieb,
Responding to Human Rights Abuses in the Digital Era: New Tools, Old Challenges,
54 STAN. J. INT'L L. 259, 262 (2018) (discussing how digital tools can support human
rights laws).
49. See generally John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of
Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence
[https://perma.cc/3WAP-LD63].
50. See id.
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elsewhere in human affairs.51 Despite the naive politics that promoted
its early adoption, the term "cyberspace" eventually entered the
general lexicon.
What does cyberspace mean to lawyers and the legal academy?
Some commentators have used the term interchangeably with the term
"Internet," while others associate cyberspace with the software
technologies that enable Internet communications. Katsh notes that
online forms of interaction between individuals and other people or
businesses are substitutes for physical places, and hence cyberspace
experiences are transformed into a culture with values, norms and
expectations about acquiring, exchanging, using, and processing
information in some ways analogous to those of physical places.52
Similarly, the dynamic change and internal diversity of the Internet,
along with the complex interdependent interactions among law,
norms, cyberspace and the network, have been analogized to a "digital
biosphere."53 A digital persona's life journey through the digital
biosphere model helps to show that, as technology becomes more
pervasive in our lives, it becomes interwoven with our norms in a
complex, interactive, and dynamic-almost organic-relationship.54
Though some critical populations are cut off from many of its
features, the digital biosphere is international. Thus, some
commentators have pointed out the drawbacks of applying territory-
based regulatory models to the brave new world of cyberspace.5 Their
work suggests that the old world of regulating atoms has little to offer
a world of bits and bytes that zip about the planet. For example, David
Johnson and David Post have staked out a broadly cyberlibertarian
position.56 Johnson and Post's early work argued that the regulation of
cyberspace must necessarily be different from the regulation of real
space because cyberspace does not have territorial boundaries, but
rather it exists simultaneously in multiple jurisdictions57 They
asserted that the cost and speed of the transmission of data on the
Internet is almost entirely independent of physical location, and users
51. See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO RULES THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS
OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 131-33 (2006); see also James Grimmelmann, Anarchy,
Status Updates, and Utopia, 35 PACEL. REv. 135, 144, 146 (2015).
52. See M. Ethan Katsh, Software Worlds and the First Amendment: Virtual
Doorkeepers in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 335, 353 (1996).
53. Arthur J. Cockfield, Designing Tax Policy for the Digital Biosphere:
How the InternetIs Changing Tax Laws, 34 CONN. L. REv. 333, 334 (2002).
54. See id.; see also infra Section IV.B.
55. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders The Rise ofLaw
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1379-80, 1397 (1996).
56. See id.
57. See id. at 1370-71.
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can evade territorial-based rules by moving to more favorably
regulated areas.
According to the Johnson-Post model, cyberspace should hence
be treated as a separate "space" with its own distinct laws." Their
cyberlibertarian model rejected a field of regulation as dense or
encompassing as that governing "real space" (or "meat space," a
quasi-pejorative popular among cyberpunks). They instead preferred
self-regulation whereby cyberspace participants would develop their
"own effective legal institutions."59 This point of view proved
extraordinarily influential in the U.S., where Congress upended stable
fields of law to provide broad immunities from taxation and regulation
for leading Intemet-based firms and Internet Service Providers. Some
effective self-regulatory bodies developed consensus and agreement
on Internet hardware and software standards, including the World
Wide Web Consortium, the Internet Engineering Task Force, and the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).60
However, none are capable of addressing the panoply of problems
recently identified with Internet politics, economics, and culture.61
If cyberspace truly is a new realm beyond the reach of states,
Internet users may not be subject to rules from states where they are
not physically located, even if those states have vital interests in
prohibiting or regulating the transactions or communications these
"netizens" engage in-a recipe for wholesale law breaking. The
Johnson-Post model generally only incorporates the interests of
Internet users who, it is argued, have distinct needs that cannot be
effectively addressed by territorial-based sovereigns.62 But such users
also have effects on those who do wish for territorial sovereign
protection.63
The Johnson-Post model selectively depicts one version of the
Internet (then and today), along with the inherent difficulties in
regulating this new forum. The model suffers from normative
58. See id. at 1379.
59. Id. at 1387.
60. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward
a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REv. 749 (2003).
61. For an overview of these problems, see generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE
BLACK Box SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND
INFORMATION (2015).
62. See id. at 1402 (explaining how certain characteristics of online use
require different laws than those applicable to physical geographically defined
boundaries).
63. See Frank Pasquale, From Territorial to Functional Sovereignty: The
Case ofAmazon, L. & POL. EcON. BLOG (Dec. 6, 2017), https://1peblog.org/
2017/12/06/from-territorial-to-functional-sovereignty-the-case-of-amazon/
[https://perma.cc/UGZ9-W3VU].
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problems when it suggests that regulators should, for the most part,
maintain a hands-off approach to the Internet. As philosophers are
fond of reminding us, an "is" is not necessarily an "ought."64 The fact
that the Internet is difficult to regulate does not mean that governments
ought not strive to regulate the Internet. For instance, as Goldsmith
has noted, "the state in which the harms are suffered has a legitimate
interest in regulating the activity that produces the harms."65
That is not to say that statutes and regulations should not evolve
in order to adapt to cyberspace. Nor is it meant to deny the value of a
legal academic field that explores the unusual issues that have anisen
as free expression, jurisdiction, notice, trespass, and other key legal
concepts are applied to and tested in online disputes. A classic denial
in that vein came from Judge Frank Easterbrook. Easterbrook viewed
cyberlaw as an unhelpful disciplinary focus because, he claimed, it led
to an overly specialized perspective that removes legal conflicts from
their broader context. 66 He analogized cyberlaw to a fanciful "law of
the horse," which might have tempted legal scholars to stray from the
eternal verities of contracts, just war theory, torts, and civil procedure
when equine-enabled transport and warfare began to change
societies.67 Such a focus would seem entirely antiquated today, when
cars, trains, and drones have supplanted stagecoaches and cavalries.
Under this view, cyberlaw is unhelpful as it fails to illuminate the
entire law.
In our view, Easterbrook's provocative analogy falls apart upon
close examination. The Internet and associated "cyber" technologies
are important and becoming more dominant now, while horses are not
nearly as critical to contemporary economic, political, and cultural
infrastructure. The same was true when Easterbrook wrote his article.
Moreover, a "law of the horse" does exist in the U.S., in the form of
regulations elaborating how the Animal Welfare Act (at the federal
level) and various state animal protection statutes (at the state level)
regulate the feeding, breeding, racing, keeping, and euthanasia of
horses. Libertarians may deplore the administrative state's
"interference" with equine affairs, but that is an ideological position
that reflects a wish for no law of the horse-not its actuality.
64. See, e.g., Jane Bailey, Of Mediums and Metaphors: How a Layered
Methodology Might Contribute to a Constitutional Analysis of Internet Content
Regulation, 30 MAN. L.J. 197, 197 (2004) (arguing thatthe question as to whetherthe
Internet can be regulated should not be conflated with whether it shouldbe regulated).
65. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1200
(1998).
66. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207-08.
67. See id.
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As Lawrence Lessig responded to Easterbrook, cyberlaw
courses provide valuable insight into the limits of traditional law as a
regulator of behavior.68 For a student who wanted to practice law in
horse racing or similar contexts, classes on the "law of the horse"
would be useful. There are far more positions in cyberlaw, and
therefore, simply as an instructional element in law schools, we should
expect "cyberlaw" to persist. Cyberlaw as a focus of research will also
continue be of use to policymakers.
Some law and technology perspectives also respond to
Easterbrook's critique by illuminating the broader relationship
between law and all technologies versus focusing on a specific
technology (such as information technologies related to the Internet).69
Other perspectives rely on mature theories of technology outside of
law to assist with legal analysis.
Internet exceptionalists like Post and Johnson and Internet legal
deflaters like Easterbrook may seem to have little in common.
However, a common sensibility has animated both strains of work.
Each school has tended toward an instrumentalist point of view,
characterizing the Internet as one more way of accomplishing set
human ends. To resist calls for regulation, Johnson and Post had to
make a jurisdictional, not an essentialist, claim about Internet
activity.70 They ideologically "located" it outside extant sovereigns'
reach.7l This is a point of view now shared by blockchain enthusiasts
who insist on calling that technology "immutable" and
"unstoppable."72 Easterbrook's error was more obvious. He simply
assumed that the Internet would enable one more way of commenting,
transacting, gambling, the way a horse enabled better transport than
68. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might
Teach, 113 HARV. L. REv. 501, 502 (1999).
69. See Cockfield, supra note 21, at 3 87-88; see also infra Part IV.
70. See Johnson & Post, supra note 55, at 1369-70.
71. This was a problematic approach insofar as it downplayed the materiality
of Internet infrastructure, which is vulnerable to state interference, and in many cases
ought to be. Moreover, as Julie Cohen diagnosed, "[t]he cyberspace metaphor does
not refer to abstract, Cartesian space, but instead expresses an experienced spatiality
mediated by embodied human cognition. Cyberspace in this sense is relative, mutable,
and constituted via the interactions among practice, conceptualization, and
representation" Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 210,
210 (2007).
72. See Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market
Infrastructure: A Consideration of Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 837, 861 (2015) (critiquing ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING
BITCoIN: UNLOCKING DIGITAL CRYPTOCURRENCIES (2014) and Campbell R. Harvey,
Bitcoin Myths and Facts 5 (Aug. 18, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2479670
[https://perma.cc/X9LA-9ETF]).
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walking. He did not appreciate the ways in which such activities could
be fundamentally changed by their digitization in contexts of rapid
communication and information sharing.
B. Code is/as/and Law
Lawrence Lessig's groundbreaking book Code and Other Laws
of Cyberspace offered a nuanced "middle way" between the "nothing
new" approach of Easterbrook to cyberlaw and the "totally new"
approach taken by the cyberlibertarians.73 Observing that software
physically preventing copying of a DVD may be just as effective as
prohibitions under copyright law, Lessig maintained that code could
act as a law of its own but also could be shaped by law. Lessig also
observed the ways in which technology and law could reinforce one
another. For example, if governments are worried that consumers will
access pornography in public libraries, they could pass a law to
mandate the installation of filtering software on library computers,
which would inhibit access.
Lessig's views represent a clear articulation of an instrumentalist
approach to law and technology (as well as norms). Lessig's work
embodies instrumentalism because the pragmatic analogy between
code and law also embraces an even broader set of modalities of
control, including social norms and markets, in Lessig's terms. By
presenting very broad categories of human interaction as
pragmatically analogous methods of generating certain results, Lessig
helped set discourse on law and technology in the direction of social
engineenng.74
This, again, is a legacy of Chicago: Just as his one-time Chicago
colleague Cass Sunstein pressed the ultra-utilitarian ideal of a "cost-
benefit state," Lessig's modalities could be seen as varied tools to
maximize social welfare. And just as Sunstein's and Lessig's Chicago
forebears had advanced economics as a higher authority than law, set
to displace the common law and statutes where they proved
"inefficient," Lessig characterized social norms, markets, and
technology as all in some way the co-equal of law-its potential
replacement, rather than phenomena ideally subject to its shaping
73. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBER
SPACE (2000).
74. This path was later more fully realized in DAVID HOWARTH, LAW AS
ENGINEERING: THINKING ABOUT WHAT LAWYERS Do (2013).
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power., Lessig has long since left Chicago for Harvard, in part to
pursue research on corruption.76
The "code is law" perspective recognizes that government
technical interventions may lead to socially ambivalent results-
requiring further intervention.7 As noted, governments are embracing
or developing powerful surveillance technologies to promote national
security interests. But this approach raises the risk that abusive state
practices could take place, inhibiting important democratic values.
Governments could counter-balance this risk by mandating the use of
other technologies.7 With respect to concerns surrounding state
surveillance, governments could, for example, pass legislation that
would: (1) create digital trails that track how state agents use
technologies to collect and store personal information; (2) mandate the
"scrubbing" of personally identifying information from large
databases; and (3) provide for "low tech" solutions such as publishing
lists of public spaces that are subject to police surveillance.79
This cyborg-ish mix of law and technology may seem to
vindicate the instrumentalist understanding of their
interchangeability.80 However, substantivists would be quick to
emphasize that technological and legal developments can change
(rather than simply better or worse serve) the social goals of mass
surveillance and shape individuals' expectations of privacy and free
expression.81 Scholars are obliged to study past patterns of such effects
if they are to fairly advise on the true impact of changing balances of
law, technology, markets, and norms in various fields.
75. Note that James Buchanan took the Chicago approach one step further,
developing an economics that commended the uprooting of even constitutional law
when it stood in the way of a certain vision of economic order. See NANCY MCLEAN,
DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS: THE DEEP HISTORY OF THE RADICAL RIGHT'S STEALTH PLAN
FOR AMERICA 155 (2017).
76. See generally Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand
"Corruption" to Mean, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2014).
77. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Who Watches the Watchers? A Law and
Technology Perspective on Government and Private Sector Surveillance, 29 QUEEN'S
L.J. 364, 400 (2003).
78. See id. at 400-02.
79. For a survey of technological approaches to "watch the watchers," see
generally Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441 (2011).
80. See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLAL. REV. 678, 693 (2013).
81. See infra Subsection III.A.2.
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C. The Problematic Results of Cyberlaw Instrumentalism
Even the earliest technological developments-fire, aqueducts,
roads-have impacted human lives, customs, and laws. Technology
can have a gradual impact on human lives, such as improvements in
home insulation over the past few centuries. Alternatively, it can
provide a jolt that paves the way for entire new eras of human
development, from the widespread uses of axes and mortar for stone
building to indoor plumbing, the steam engine, electricity,
automobiles, and the Internet. The latter developments raise the
question whether technology developments follow a continuous
pattern or whether they usher in entirely new technological eras. To
promote optimal policy outcomes, cyberlaw discussions asked
whether "traditional" laws would suffice or whether entirely new
approaches are needed. Similarly, observers began to examine in a
more critical fashion how the direct regulation of software and
hardware technologies could promote optimal legal solutions.
The code-is-law school of thought has recognized that
technology imposes constraints on the behavior of individuals and
businesses. Thus, there is no simple libertarian calculus to equate
deregulation of technology with an increase in freedom. In a world
increasingly mediated by complex technologies, broader areas of
technology could be subject to legal regulation as an effective
mechanism to protect interests and to enhance the liberty of those
constrained by current controllers of technology.82
Unfortunately, this lesson of code is law was not the main
takeaway of the debates arising out of Lessig's and related works.
Those emphasizing cyberspace as a new place, ideally transcending or
existing outside past forms of regulation, advanced a set of normative
commitments that tended to counterbalance the insights arising out of
code-is-law theory. Such intuitions supported sweepingly
deregulatory interventions-such as the United States'
82. See ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF
PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER (1952) (calling for "public control of private governing
power"); see also Warren J. Samuels, The Economy as a System of Power and Its
Legal Bases: The Legal Economics ofRobert Lee Hale, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF
HETERODOX POLITICAL ECONOMY 184 (1992) (quoting Robert L. Hale, Hale Papers
32 (unpublished works) (Folder 93-1) ("There is government whenever one person or
group can tell others what they must do and when those others have to obey or suffer
a penalty.")); Frank Pasquale, Platform Neutrality: Enhancing Freedom ofExpression
in Spheres of Private Power, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 487, 487 (2016)
("[P]rivacy, competition, and consumer protection laws.... enable a more vibrant
public sphere. . . . [by] defus[ing] the twin specters of monopolization and total
surveillance, which are grave threats to freedom of expression.").
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Communications Decency Act § 230, which insulated online
intermediaries from many forms of liability stemming from published
works.83 The code-is-law approach tended to legitimate such
interventions, by implying that so many things could take the place of
law (such as market forces, social norms, or software) that law itself
was not that important to the development of the Internet.
For example, if you don't like the way in which Facebook,
Google, or Twitter handles right-wing extremism or defamation, call
them out on social media to evoke social norms. Or boycott them to
hit their profits. Or unleash automated bots that can evade their
manipulation detectors to shape the platforms in ways you would like.
At various points, libertarian thinkers and think tanks have advanced
each of these strategies as ways of promoting spontaneous order in
cyber-realms. But such approaches have repeatedly failed to bring
about the type of emancipatory and egalitarian online experience
promised by the Internet's earliest boosters. The main problem, as the
next section shows, is that legal scholars on both sides of the code-as-
law and cyberspace-as-place debates tended to adopt a narrowly
instrumentalist understanding of technology. A more substantivist
approach is needed.
III. SUBSTANTIVISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO INSTRUMENTALISM
Instrumental perspectives generally view technology as a neutral
tool. Like economists viewing purchasing behavior as a "revealed
preference" for certain states of affairs,84 instrumentalists tend to bless
(or at least accept) technological adoption patterns as the result of
uncoerced, individual choice. The structural background, which made
some choices prominent and others occluded, some cheap and easy,
and others expensive and hard, remains in the background.
Despite its blindspots, given the influence of methodological
individualism in the contemporary Anglosphere legal academy,
instrumentalism may seem like the best way to develop a social theory
of law and technology. However, there is an alternative. Substantivist
theories analyze how technology can transform human experience,
identity, and aims.85 Substantivists particularly worry about how
83. See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
84. See Marcel K. Richter, Revealed Preference Theory, 34 ECONOMETRICA
635 (1966).
85. See generally Frank Pasquale, Technology, Competition, and Values, 8
MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 607 (2007) (discussing the technological transformation of
aims).
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technological "structure" can subvert interests that have been
traditionally protected by law.
We acknowledge up front there are now thousands of law and
technology works, and any effort to boil these down to common
themes is invariably reductionist. However, synthesis should prove
particularly useful in the field of law and technology to show areas of
commonality within over-arching analytical approaches.
A. Theoretical Perspectives
Many disciplines have developed mature theories of
technology.86 Social theories of technology are fruitfully divided into
two groups: those that rely on so-called instrumental theories or
perspectives on technology and those that follow substantive theories
about technology.7 In outlining these theories, we are laying the
foundation for an academic contribution inspired by John Maynard
Keynes's observation that "[p]ractical men, who believe themselves
to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence [] are usually the
slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear
voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic
scribbler of a few years back."88 In other words, such an examination
allows us to surface the deep ideological structure of argument in areas
as seemingly au courant and technocratic as cryptocurrency
regulation.9
86. This approach is used by many non-legal academic disciplines. See, e.g.,
NASSER BEHNEGAR, LEO STRAUSS, MAX WEBER, AND THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF
POLITICS (2003) (discussing different scientific approaches to the study of political
science); PAUL STONEMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION (2002)
(providing an economist's perspective on theories of technology); LANGDON WINNER,
AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY: TECHNICS-OUT-OF-CONTROL AS A THEME IN POLITICAL
THOUGHT (1977) (analyzing the politics of technology and criticizing the uncritical
acceptance of new technologies); Hughes, supra note 29 (setting out historians' views
on technology theories). At times, academic disciplines have developed more focused
theories involving certain technologies, which co-exist with broader theories of
technology. For example, a sociologist might explore the impact of information
technologies on workplace environments within broader attempts to examine
technological interactions with social structures. See, e.g., THE SOCIAL SHAPING OF
TECHNOLOGY (Donald MacKenzie & Judy Wajcman eds., 2d ed. 1999).
87. See, e.g., FEENBERG, supra note 4, at 5-6.
88. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST AND MONEY 383 (1936).
89. Clifford Geertz's work in "ideology as a cultural system" is our guide
here, as is the work of "interpretive social science" in general. See, e.g., Charles
Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Aan, in INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE: A
READER 25 (Paul Rabinow & William M. Sullivan eds., 1979); Paul Ricoeur, The
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Generally speaking, instrumental theorists are less interested in
the broader social, cultural, and political impacts of technology than
they are in its role as a tool helping individuals pursue their own ends.90
The instrumentalists are often identified with strains of thought that
prioritize individual autonomy or agency in matters of technology,
thanks primarily to an emphasis on human willpower to decide
whether to adopt technologies. Many of these conceptions of tech-
nology rest on the optimistic premise that technology change produces
largely beneficent results for individuals and their communities, since
technology adoption reveals a preference for it rather than coercion
into using it.91
In contrast, substantive theories of technology emphasise the
ways in which technological systems (or "structure") can have a sub-
stantive impact on individual and community interests that may differ
from the technologies' intended impact. Technology may change
values and goals, not merely help individuals achieve them.92 Sub-
stantive theorists sometimes emphasise how technological structure
can overcome human willpower or even institutional action. By
"structure," it is not meant that machines control us, but rather that
technological developments can subtly (or unsubtly) undermine
important interests that the law has traditionally protected.
Both instrumental and substantive perspectives on technology
can inform theories of the relationship between law and technology.
There can be very fruitful conversations within each school. However,
debates among adherents to different schools are likely to founder
because they share so few grounding commitments. As Gadamer
observed, there is a need for some shared horizons to engage in
meaningful conversation.93
Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text, in INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL
SCIENCE: A READER, supra, at 73.
90. This Part draws from an earlier work. See generally Arthur J. Cockfield
& Jason Pridmore, A Synthetic Theory of Law and Technology, 8 MINN. J.L. Sci. &
TECH. 475 (2007).
91. For an example of coercion to use technology, see generally Jennifer A.
Chandler, "Obligatory Technologies": Explaining Why People Feel Compelled to
Use Certain Technologies, 32 BULL. SCI. TECH. & SoC'Y 255 (2012) (explaining the
requirements to undergo back surgery or use genetically modified crops); Frank
Pasquale, Cognition-Enhancing Drugs: Can We Say No?, 30 BULL. SCI. TECH. &
SoC'Y 9 (2010).
92. See generally Pasquale, supra note 85.
93. See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (19 7 5).
"[I]nterpretation is the common ground of interaction between text and interpreter, by
which each establishes its being ... interpreter and text are indissolubly linked as a
matter of being." For applications of Gadamer to legal interpretation, see William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 617-18
(1990).
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1. Instrumental Perspectives on Technology as a Neutral Tool
The instrumentalist perspective tends to articulate optimistic
conceptions of a society that has taken full advantage of the
technological tools at its disposal. A number of theorists, particularly
those in management studies and economics, hold that technology is
simply a tool-an instrument of the social, political, or economic
group, or of the individual that chooses to develop and use a certain
technology.94 Entrenched in boardrooms, the technology trade press,
and industry-funded think tanks, this instrumental perspective is the
most widely accepted view of technology.95 "It is [rooted] in many
social sciences and bureaucratic organizations, from business to
government to non-profit organizations, and pervades everyday
[discussions] regarding technology in the larger society."96 This
perspective on technology holds that technology is neutral, solely
serving the intended purposes held for it by its users.97
The phrase "guns don't kill people, people kill people" reflects
the instrumentalist mindset.98 When there is a mass shooting in the
U.S., gun rights advocates blame individuals-or their mental health
issues-for the massacre. Similarly, those who wish to immunize
peer-to-peer file sharing networks call the "dual use" of the technology
a hallmark of its neutrality.99 Promoters of net neutrality advance a
normative vision of the "pipes" of the Internet eschewing any
favoritism as to which content they prioritize, delay, or degrade.
Neutrality is not merely a descriptive term, but in some technological
settings a liberal virtue, as it is at bottom procedural, appealing to our
sense of fairness in process, rather than any more substantive notion
of optimal results.
For instrumentalists, the use of certain forms of technology may
preclude the use of other technologies, but these trade-offs are
calculable choices rationally arrived at through different forms of
debate.oo If technology itself affects these debates, it is once again
94. See generally CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA:
WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAL (1997) (leading the
"disruptionist" school in business studies).
95. See generally Cockfield & Pridmore, supra note 90 (discussing
instrumental and substantive perspectives and theories of technology).
96. Id. at 480.
97. See id.
98. See generally JOHN R. LOTT, MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME (1998).
99. Alfred C. Yen, T/hat Federal Gun Control Can Teach Us About the
DMICA's Anti-Trafficking Provisions, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 649, 673 (2003).
100. See, e.g., WILLIAM GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD 252 (1995). Authors who
espouse this perspective, albeit rarely explicitly, clearly prefer public and democratic
debate.
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characterized as neutral. Indeed, a good deal of Internet triumphalism
characterized the medium as the most neutral public sphere of all,
enabling anyone to grab a digital soapbox and popularize their ideas.o
This understanding of technology strongly emphasizes human
agency and downplays the potential limitations of technological
systems (i.e., structures). For the instrumentalists, human beings can
and do direct the use of technology, and the fears of technological
tyranny overcoming human autonomy are unfounded. Some
instrumental approaches, such as those found in the management
sciences, ignore questions of individual autonomy because they are
exclusively focused on enhancing efficiency, leaving the social
questions to other disciplines.102
This instrumental view can be seen as a backdrop to many of the
perspectives that articulate the arrival of a new information society.
One of most well-known of these perspectives is Alvin Toffler's The
Third Wave, in which he articulates three "waves" of technological
innovation: agricultural, industrial, and informational.103 The last of
these, in whose throes we presumably remain today, has transformed
our world into one oriented toward and almost completely dependent
upon computer communication technologies.
Instrumentalist perspectives are often optimistic about
technology. When the "extensions of man" are characterized as ways
of realizing (rather than thwarting or changing) persons' aims, it is
hard not to get excited about their dissemination and wary of their
regulation or limitation.104 Sociological theorists like Manuel Castells
share this optimism to differing extents, but his is a cautious optimism.
The social theories concerned with technology tend to be a bit more
pessimistic about potentials for technology. The predominance of
technological structure as a continuation of previous modes of social
and political practice that overwhelms individual will in a
dehumanizing way is also apparent in the works of sociologists of
technology.
2. Substantive Theories of Technology
At this point, it may be helpful to offer examples of how
technologies can have a political, social, cultural, or other substantive
101. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
102. See, e.g., Rias J. van Wyk, supra note 7, at 19-3 1.
103. See ALVIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE 26(1980).
104. See ITHIEL DE LA SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 226-27 (1983);
see also ADAM THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION: THE CONTINUING CASE FOR
COMPREHENSIVE TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM 2-6 (2014).
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impact on society so that they are not merely neutral tools. We offer
examples of substantive theories of technology, to counterbalance the
tilt of Part II's cyberlaw discussion toward instrumentalist
approaches.105
Numerous ways exist for engaging in a sociological analysis of
technology. Some of these are rooted in the earliest traditions of
sociological analysis, such as those associated with Karl Marx, Max
Weber, Emile Durkheim, and George Simmel. Others have begun to
reorient the field of study beyond these modes of inquiry and toward
approaches less reliant upon their sociological forbearers.106 The
examination of the relationship between law and technology at times
draws from critical theories that purport to clear away the fog that
occurs when traditional legal analysis fails to illuminate the important
interests at stake. For instance, Froomkin has discussed how critical
theories help "people understand their true interests and by helping
them escape from ideological coercion."107
The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research founded in 1923 in
Frankfurt, Germany was a potent source of critical theory. Two of its
members, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adomo, offer provocative
critiques of culture in their book Dialectic of Enlightenment.o10
Throughout this text, Horkheimer and Adomo argued that the
Enlightenment, rather than liberating people from fear, has produced
new forms of authority and control.109
The underlying emphasis in this text is that technologies, and in
particular new media technologies, are designed not to encourage
human liberation and freedom but rather to set limiting parameters in
105. See supra Part II. For a discussion concerning how technologies can have
a substantive impact (e.g., highway overpass bridges deliberately built low to prevent
low-income transportation, like buses, from travelling out of New York City toward
the homes of the wealthy on Long Island), see Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have
Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121, 123-24 (1980).
106. The following review does not purport to offer a comprehensive
examination: for instance, we do not review sociological approaches that rely on
Social Systems theory or that of Critical Realism.
107. Froomkin, supra note 60, at 760-64. For a review of different theories of
technology, including those that depart from the instrumental theory, see Samuel
Trosow, The Ownership and Commodification of Legal Knowledge: Using Social
Theory of the Information Age as a Tool for Policy Analysis, 30 MAN. L.J. 417, 419-
20 (2004) (arguing against the instrumental theory of technology); see also James
Boyle, The Politics ofReason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133
U. PA. L. REv. 685, 687-88 (1985) (describing the development of legal theories that
share assumptions concerning the use of social power in apparently rational
discourse).
108. See MAx HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF
ENLIGHTENMENT (John Cumming trans., 2d ed. 1995).
109. See id. at 3.
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which human beings can express themselves. The "freedom to choose
an ideology ... everywhere proves to be freedom to [choose what is
always] the same,"11o and technology is simply another means by
which to perpetuate capitalist forms of oppression and domination.
Fellow Frankfurt School critical theorist Herbert Marcuse is
even more explicit about the role of technology in his work One
Dimensional Man. I1 In the text, Marcuse holds as a thesis the notion
that society has been collapsed into one dimension of thought or
action-a technical and rational dimension.112
One of the more recent critical texts is Andrew Feenberg's
Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited.113 Unlike
Frankfurt School theorists like Horkheimer, Adomo and Marcuse,
who explicitly and implicitly posit the predominance of structural
control, Feenberg attempts to reinstate a notion of human agency and
engage in "politics of technological transformation."114 Feenberg
believes that critical theorists' despair about inevitable technological
domination in the 1970s was a wrong turn and that critical theory
needs to engage in a more interventionist strategy.115
Feenberg continued this approach in 2017's Technosystem,
which takes issue with Christian Fuchs and Jodi Dean for, inter alia,
essentializing current patterns of power on the Internet (particularly
those that centralized in major Internet platforms and Internet Service
Providers) as inevitable concomitants of the technology.116 Feenberg
usefully distinguishes between critiques of technology itself, as
opposed to present configurations of technology. However, he might
have chosen better targets. Dean is quite explicit in her work Blog
Theory that "communicative capitalism," as opposed to social
networking itself, is at least in part responsible for what she
characterizes as the depoliticizing and narcotizing aspects of online
experiences. Both Dean and Fuchs promote a more public-spirited
Internet eventually coming to replace corporate-dominated systems.117
110. Id. at 135-36.
111. See generally HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN
THE IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1964).
112. See id. at xxvi (explaining the one-dimensional man).
113. See ANDREW FEENBERG, TRANSFORMING TECHNOLOGY: A CRITICAL
THEORY REVISITED (2002).
114. Id. at 13.
115. See id. at 18.
116. See ANDREW FEENBERG, TECHNOSYSTEM: THE SOCIAL LIFE OF REASON
89-99 (2017).
117. See generally JODIDEAN, BLOG THEORY: FEEDBACK AND CAPTURE IN THE
CIRCUITS OF DRIVE (2010); CHRISTIAN FUCHS, INTERNET AND SOCIETY: SOCIAL
THEORY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2007).
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3. Weber's "Iron Cage" and Ellul's "Technique"
The views of two late law professors, Max Weber and Jacques
Ellul, have proven to be particularly influential. Their writings share
some of the common elements of substantive theories of technology
from which our substantivist perspective on law and technology is
drawn.
In the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,", Max
Weber suggests that Puritan ethics and ideas influenced the
development of capitalism.119 Weber describes capitalism as creating
an organizational shift towards rationalization and bureaucratization
from a value-oriented organization to a goal-oriented organization. As
a result, the increased rationalization of human life traps individuals
in an "iron cage" of rule-based, rational control: The new economic
order "is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of
machine production which to-day determine the lives of all individuals
who are born into this mechanism . . . with irresistible force."20
Though Weber's notion of the iron cage-the restrictive
rationalization of human life that society has created for itself-has
filtered throughout many contemporary texts, it is perhaps best
rearticulated in light of the theoretical position of Jacques Ellul. Ellul
suggests in his widely cited text, The Technological Society, that
current society and society's future will be one in which people
become increasingly dependent on machines.121 This is a society in
which people order their lives to accommodate the demand of
rationality and efficiency, the mode of operation upon which machines
exist.122
In his numerous texts, Ellul questions whether such a society has
indeed progressed. He contends it has not, and that the advent of the
technological environment has seriously impinged upon human
118. MAx WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM
(Talcott Parsons trans., 1958).
119. See id.
120. Id. at 123. Weber rejects the metaphor of capitalism as a "light cloak"
that can be thrown aside in favor of the metaphor of an "iron cage." Id. For an effort
to link Weber's views more directly with technology concerns, see Terry Maley, Max
Weber and the Iron Cage of Technology, 24 BULL. SCI. TECH. & Soc'Y 69 (2004)
(claiming that Weber should be reassessed as a compelling critic of science and
technology). Importantly, Maley suggests that there is a potential for human agency
found within Weber's work and that one need not take the same direction as Ellul. See
id. at 74. Rather Weber "does not foreclose the possibility of meaningful intervention"
in his postulation of the iron cage. Id. at 84.
121. See JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 305 (John Wilkinson
trans., 1964).
122. See id. at 74.
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freedom and autonomy. 123 In his writing, the social, political, and
economic worlds are seen in terms of epochal transitions, and Ellul
was concerned about what he saw as a particularly dire transition to
an oppressive epoch-that of the technological society.124
In this technological society, all of life is being subsumed by
"technique" described as "the totality of methods rationally arrived at
and having absolute efficiency ... in every field of human activity."125
In this environment, everything is measured against its rationality and
efficiency.
4. Technological Determinism and Recent Efforts
One of the underlying concerns in most substantive theories of
technology is the notion of technological determinism.126 These
theories frame technology, to greater or lesser extents, as inherently
possessing a structure that in turn produces a society that must act and
exist in certain ways. 127 Modem technologies, as suggested by Ellul
and others, are the real culprits in enhancing this determinism.128
Critics assert that some of the above-noted substantive
approaches can be too deterministic, because they attribute too many
of society 's current features to the technology it adopts. More recent
works have tried to address the issue of technological determinism by
trying to assess its complexities in a more comprehensive manner. For
Manuel Castells, the transformation towards information capitalism is
one in which the social, economic, and political worlds have become
centralized around networks that link people, institutions, and
countries.129 This is "the network society" we now dwell within, and it
is largely a result of the development of information and
communication technologies such as the Internet and mobile phones
that enable communication and the transmission of information and
123. See id. at 138.
124. See JACQUES ELLUL, WHAT I BELIEVE 89, 135 (Geoffrey W. Bromily
trans., 1989).
125. ELLUL, supra note 121, at xxv.
126. See id. at xvii.
127. See id. at 138, 406.
128. See generally id. Martin Heidegger's The Question Concerning
Technology and Other Essays, provides another well-known view that technology is
interwoven in complex ways with individual identities so that it can structure or frame
individual choices. See generally MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE QUESTION CONCERNING
TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS (William Lovitt trans., 1977).
129. See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 18-22
(1996).
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ideas to occur on an unprecedented global scale.130 By shifting the
focus in social analysis towards that of a network, Castells has
articulated a new way of understanding the connection between
humanity and technology.131 Castells' work places people and their
artifacts in a mutually bound relationship.132
In addition to focusing on networks as a unit of analysis (like
Castells does), Science and Technology Studies (STS) aim to
understand "science and technology as social relations and as socially
constructed."133 So while Castells gives us a sense of how important
networks are to technology and vice versa, STS gives us a sense of the
complexity of social structures behind the production, distribution,
and consumption of science and technology. According to STS, we
can learn more about technology by paying attention to the processes
by which technologies are made and the myriad ways in which these
technologies may be put to use, which vary in degree from the
intentions or original design.134 This suggests that science and
technology developments are driven by social relationships and
networks as well as formalized practices and the employment of
scientific methodology. Principally, STS demonstrates that scientific
and technological practices are far more socially nuanced and complex
than dominant public perceptions and presentations of these practices
suggest.
As for a theoretical framing of these issues, one theory
articulated by a number of STS researchers is the Actor-Network
Theory (ANT).135 ANT posits that the work of "technoscience," a term
that indicates the interdependence of science and technology, is about
130. MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INTERNET GALAXY: REFLECTIONS ON THE
INTERNET, BUSINESS, AND SOCIETY 2 (2001).
131. See id. at 2-3.
132. See id. at 2.
133. WENDA K. BAUCHSPIES, JENNIFER CROISSANT, & SAL RESTIVO, SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 1 (2006). See generally THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE
SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY (Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, &
Trevor Pinch eds., 2012).
134. By way of example, cellular phones were designed to enable wireless
communications, but because technologies were needed to calculate the physical
location of the cell phone to work, they are also now used as a government tracking
devices to the extent that state agents can access telephone company records that track
the geographic location of the phone's usage. See, e.g., In re Application for Pen
Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747,
754 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ("While the cell phone was not originally conceived as a
tracking device, law enforcement converts it to that purpose by monitoring cell site
data.").
135. See SERGIO SISMONDO, AN INTRODUCTION TO SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
STUDIES 65 (2d ed. 2004).
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the creation of larger and stronger networks. For ANT, these networks
are heterogeneous, including "[b]oth human and non-humans [that]
have interests that . . .need to be accommodated."136 Under this view,
technology and technological processes help construct social
situations, just as human beings do.
The relationship between technology and history is likewise
complex: Technological development and use have many outcomes.
Technology is not given to one specific future, despite Ellul's dire
warnings of a social world in which technique dominates. Nor is
technology solely a slave to capitalist enterprises as some sociological
perspectives might suggest. As opposed to a relatively strict
technological determinism, notions of a "soft determinism" remain
tenable.137 Thus, technologies may be seen as embedded in a particular
"technological frame[]" that serves to guide or configure future
actions and relationships with those technologies, their users, and their
subjects.138 Overall, STS demonstrates that there is an interrelation
between historical social development and the development of
technology. Rather than suggesting that one drives the other (a
reductionist critique of the perspectives of both instrumentalism and
technological determinism), STS seeks a middle ground, seeing
history and technological development as intertwined.
136. Id. at 81. The goal of these networks is to act together to achieve a
particular and consistent effect in a machine-like fashion. See id at 65. The goal may
likewise be to produce particular facts, in which the network is employed to ensure
that the components are in agreement. See id. at 82. Empirical research informed by
ANT tends to focus both on the interests of the actors being examined (human,
machine, or artifact) and the socially inscribed process of "translating" these interests.
See id In both scientific and technological endeavours, ANT highlights the very social
nature of the work that is involved in the relationships that exist or are made to exist
between objects and their representations. See id. at 82.
137. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Individual Autonomy, Law, and Technology:
Should Soft Determinism Guide Legal Analysis?, 30 BULL. SCI. TECH. & Socy 4, 6
(2010).
138. See SISMONDO, supra note 135, at 103. Technological frames are built up
after periods of "[i]nterpretive [f|lexibility," in which a given technology can be seen
as having numerous potential trajectories. See id. at 143. STS typically points out that
in the end the social expectations and the design of a given technology begin to
coalesce around a singular purpose and expectation. The technological frame and the
reduction in interpretive flexibility serve to both configure the way a particular
technology is able to be used as well as configure the user of that technology by setting
the parameters under which the technology may be socially expected to be used. See
id. at 87. This view is consistent with views of observers who assert that technology
developments cannot be separated from social, cultural, economic, and political
processes. To a certain extent, this view departs from what has been called the
instrumental theory of technology where technologies should be adopted as long as
they promote an instrumental purpose that enhances efficiency. See FEENBERG, supra
note 33, at 5.
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IV. REVISITING CYBERLAW FROM A SUBSTANTIVIST PERSPECTIVE
Scholars have recognized the need for a more holistic
perspective in cyberlaw and broader law and technology analysis.139 In
Part II, we discussed several shortcomings of dominant,
instrumentalist perspectives in cyberlaw. A foundational debate for
the field-whether cyberlaw was an entirely new area, or merely a
"[1]aw of the [h]orse" destined to be absorbed into traditional doctrinal
categories-obscured the narrow methodological foundations of the
origins of the field.140 Commentators modeled quintessentially legal
dilemmas as essentially engineering problems-to be solved via
principles of maximization of some agreed upon end, be it efficiency,
innovation, or progress. 141 The common reception of Lawrence
Lessig's "modalities" approach further muddied the waters by
modeling computer code as a functional equivalent to law, markets,
architecture, or norms. 142
Social theory, science and technology studies, and sociological
approaches to technology have become increasingly influential in
cyberlaw scholarship.143 These approaches have complemented the
economics- and engineering-inspired views of what might be termed
"Cyberlaw 1.0." While it is impossible to survey this entire field,
beginning with Section IV.A, we show in this penultimate section the
ways in which these substantivist approaches, which recognize the
139. See generally Frank Pasquale, Technology, Competition, and Values, 8
MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 607 (2007); Cockfield, supra note 21.
140. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 66.
141. See generally DAVID HOWARTH, LAW AS ENGINEERING: THINKING ABOUT
WHAT LAWYERS Do (2013). This approach is troubling because there are so many
ways in which problem definition-a given for engineers-is contested in so many
legal and political contexts. Moreover, the field of engineering lacks many of the
safeguards necessary for such modeling. See, e.g., David A. Banks, Engineered for
Dystopia, BAFFLER (Jan. 24, 2018), https://thebaffler.com/latest/engineered-for-
dystopia-banks [https://perma.cc/Y8BW-NVFF] ("Unlike medical professionals who
have a Hippocratic oath and a licensure process, or lawyers who have bar associations
watching over them, engineers have little ethics oversight outside of the institutions
that write their paychecks. That is why engineers excel at outsourcing blame: to
clients, to managers, or to their fuzzy ideas about the problems of human nature.").
See generally DIEGO GAMBETTA & STEFFEN HERTOG, ENGINEERS OF JIHAD (2016)
(describing the propensity of engineers to join fundamentalist and extremist
organizations).
142. See generally Lessig, supra note 68.
143. See Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to
Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 505, 517 (2005); Kieran Tranter, 'The History of the Haste Wagons': The
Motor Car Act 1909 (VIC), Emergent Technology and the Call for Law, 29 MELB. U.
L. REV. 843, 875-79 (2005) (attempting to identify common links among legal
responses to innovations).
853
Michigan State Law Review
non-linear and complex inter-relationship between technology and
individuals as well as their communities, help balance the cyberlaw
conversation. In Section IV.B, we set out how the conceptual model
of the "digital persona" acknowledges a broader role for
constitutional, human rights and other laws in holistically protecting
digital personhoods. Section IV.C explores a case study in Internet
law-regarding the regulation of robotic "expression" online-to
show the importance of balancing instrumentalist approaches to law
and technology analysis with more substantive ones.
A. The Instrumentalist-Substantivist Divide
To fully understand the differences between an instrumentalist
and a substantivist approach to law and technology, a chart of contrasts
is helpful. The chart below summarizes some instructive, ideal-typical
contrasts that will be elucidated in the rest of this section:
Instrumentalist Substantivist
Ontology Atomist/individualist Holist
Social Functionalism Conflict Theory
Scientific
Affinity
View of State Hermeneutics of Hermeneutics of
Intervention suspicion charity
Economic Capitalist/market Social democracy
Orientation
Eschatological Singularity Peaceable kingdom
Dimensions of present species
While these contrasts by no means exhaust the potential
differences between instrumentalist and substantivist approaches, they
do serve as an instructive encapsulation of the ways in which
foundational assumptions, orientations, and goals can inform research
in the field.
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1. Rival Ontologies in Cyberlaw
The question of ontology is ultimately one of the "really real,"
the ground of being.144 In instrumentalist cyberlaw scholarship,
technology itself is all too often taken as a foundational reality, which
must be accommodated. From a more substantivist approach, law and
policy can shape technology so that it better accommodates human
ends. For example, the dominant approaches to high-frequency
trading in stock markets have tended to assume that networks will
continue to speed the pace of trading-or, at the very least, that the
current pace of algorithmic finance will be maintained.145 However, it
is also possible to place law, policy, or government at the center of the
picture, as the cause of acceleration, rather than simply the site of a
belated response to it. 146
2. Social Science in Cyberlaw
As noted earlier, the economistic foundations of Cyberlaw 1.0
deeply influenced the nature of work in that vein. But there was an
even deeper social scientific orientation in this work: Mainstream
economics is a largely functionalist affair.147 Under functionalist social
science approaches, the challenge for researchers is to assemble
models of equilibrium and exchange that rationalize the existence and
interrelationships of the main actors in a scenario. Rooted in organic
metaphors (of, say, the society as a body, with each part performing a
particular function, both supported by and supporting the whole),
these functionalist approaches are biased toward elucidating
harmonious or mutually supportive exchange. This Whiggish
sensibility also informed the positive vision of cyberspace, or at least
the Internet, as a fundamentally egalitarian and democratizing force. 148
For example, in Yochai Benkler's The Wealth of Networks,
technologies of interconnection were poised to deliver unprecedented
144. Kit Fine, The Question ofOntology, in METAMETAPHYSICS: NEW ESSAYS
ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF ONTOLOGY (David Chalmers, et al., eds., 2009) 171 (framing
the goal of ontology as "clarification of the concept of what is real").
145. See generally Megan Woodward, The Need for Speed: Regulatory
Approaches to High Frequency Trading in the United States and the European Union,
50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1359 (2017).
146. See generally Frank Pasquale, Law 's Acceleration of Finance:
Redefining the Problem of High-Frequency Trading, 36 CARDOZO L. REv. 2085
(2015).
147. Frank Pasquale, Access to Medicine in an Era ofFractal Inequality, 19
ANNALS OF HEALTH LAW 269, 309 (2010).
148. See generally id. (explaining this biased view of the Internet).
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access to movies, music, and all manner of intellectual endeavor, to
individual users, disrupting content controlling oligopolies.149
Another approach toward social science is more conflict
oriented. The fundamental story here is not one of harmonious
interaction but of struggle to control resources and recognition.150
"Conflict theory" is a capacious, if awkward, category for such work.
In cyberlaw, conflict-oriented approaches have focused on the role of
large technology firms in dispossessing creators of intellectual
property of potential royalties.151 Such firms are also in conflict with
their own workers, given antitrust complaints against them as
monopsonistic price fixers of certain forms of labor via anti-poaching
agreements. 152 These kinds of conflicts have become more pronounced
in recent years, particularly given the weaponization of social media
and search in various cultural and political struggles.153 The most
prominent current example in U.S. circles is the Russian government's
sponsorship of hackers to feed disinformation into social media to
influence the outcome of the 2016 presidential election.
149. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 68 (2006) (explaining peer
production of information).
150. See generally Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition?
Dilemmas of Justice in a "Post-Socialist" Age, 212 NEW LEFT REV. (1995),
https://newleftreview.org/I/2 12/nancy-fraser-from-redistribution-to-recognition-
dilemmas-of-justice-in-a-post-socialist-age [https://perma.cc/3TF6-MBUX]
(explaining the struggle of control and recognition).
151. See Peter Jakobsson & Fredrik Stiernstedt, Pirates of Silicon Valley:
State of Exception and Dispossession in Web 2.0, FIRST MONDAY (2010),
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2799 [https://perma.cc/4CDN-
VKBR] (explaining the issues with people's dispossession of copyright and other
intellectual property).
152. See generally Frank Pasquale, Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism,
35 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 309 (2016) (reporting on Google/Apple "anti-poaching"
antitrust case).
153. See generally SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: How
SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2018); Frank Pasquale, The Automated Public
Sphere, in THE POLITICS OF BIG DATA: BIG DATA, BIG BROTHER? (Ann Rudinow
Satnan, Ingrid Schneider, & Nicola Green eds., 2018); Ramona Pringle, In 2017, Tech
Turned Dark, CBC NEWS (Dec. 26, 2017, 5:00 AM),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/tech-20 17-negative-effects-fake-news-
1.4463340 [https://perma.cc/8BLE-329K]; Tom Simonite, 2017 Was the Year We Fell
Out of Love with Algorithms, WIRED (Dec. 26, 2017, 9:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/2017-was-the-year-we-fell-out-of-love-with-
algorithms/ [https://perma.cc/3QWT-LN3T].
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3. Rival Views ofState Intervention in Cyberlaw
For dominant cyberlaw frameworks, law should only indirectly
influence technological innovations by providing a legal framework
for these developments to take place. Capitalist democracies accept
that law enables private property regimes under the values of
liberalism or in an attempt to promote wealth creation by protecting
the interests of innovators.154 Markets in turn are to determine whether
technologies persist or become obsolete. This approach supports
hermeneutics of suspicion in analyzing state intervention in digital
technologies or digital markets. For example, widespread support of
CDA § 230 immunities in the U.S., which insulate online
intermediaries from legal liability in certain circumstances, reflects
this kind of suspicion."1
By contrast, a more substantivist approach is more open to state
intervention. The right to be forgotten offers a good example of the
types of divergent approaches that can occur here.156 U.S.
commentators have tended to be very critical, assuming that the types
of negative liberty protected by the First Amendment exhaust the
capacities and potential of free expression law. European
policymakers have struck a more nuanced balance between speech
rights and privacy rights in the area of purposeful obscurity of certain
database entries.157
4. Economic Orientation: Capitalism Versus Social Democracy
For the substantivist, the market, like technology, is always
embedded in a social context and dependent on certain laws, which
are themselves reciprocally embedded in a particular economic and
technological context.1 58 Forms of market exchange like capitalism are
154. See generally STONEMAN, supra note 86, at 306 (discussing the
economics of innovation and technological diffusion and noting the need to link
policy to theorizing on welfare optimality).
155. See generally Paul Ehrlich, Communications Decency Act § 230, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 401 (2002) (discussing political pressures that encouraged the
immunization of intermediary liability).
156. See generally Emily Linn, A Look into the Data Privacy Crystal Ball: A
Survey ofPossible Outcomes for the EU-US. Privacy ShieldAgreement, 50 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1311 (2017).
157. See Frank Pasquale, Reforming the Law ofReputation, 47 Lov. U. CHI.
L.J. 515, 516 (2015) (stating that reputation justice is served by a system where some
data subjects can remove, or obscure, certain irrelevant information so as it does not
dominate the impression of an aggrieved individual).
158. See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The
Problem ofEmbeddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481, 482 (1985).
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even more specifically dependent upon certain relations of
production.159 Instrumentalists are more eager to achieve parsimony in
their models of society and, therefore, do less to emphasize the
particularity and context of situations.
For example, in cases of intermediary responsibility for online
hate speech or enabling of intellectual property infringement, an
instrumentalist is much more likely to find a particular and narrow set
of costs to minimize (such as collateral censorship) and benefits to
maximize (such as social inclusiveness and free expression). The key
to instrumentalism is defining some small set of desiderata and
adjusting law and policy to maximize them.160 A more substantivist
approach considers more closely the ways in which the Internet
changes the nature of hate speech and intellectual property
infringement.161 It sees the question of legal regulation as less of a
binary (whether to extend or not extent extant patterns of law) and
more of a context-dependent inquiry that may create the need for
whole new kinds of approaches.
5. Eschatological Dimensions: Singularity Versus Peaceable
Kingdom
Though instrumentalists tend to characterize their approach as
pragmatic, core belief systems ultimately must take a position on
futures near and far. Instrumentalism is, at its core, a wildly open-
ended approach to human relations.162 Once goals are specified, a very
wide array of means of reaching them is permitted. So, for instance, if
the goal is to increase test scores of students, any instructional set up-
from traditional classroom to iPad-prodded video lectures and
games-is appropriate to the extent it raises the scores. If the goal is
159. See RICHARD MARSDEN, THE NATURE OF CAPITAL: MARX AFTER
FOUCAULT 112 (1999).
160. See generally F. Gregory Hayden, Instrumentalist Policymaking: Policy
Criteria in a Transactional Context, 29 J. ECON. ISSUES 361 (1995).
161. See generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE
(2014) (engaging in an in-depth analysis of the nature of harassment online to ground
a set of nuanced policy proposals). Lawyer-sociologists like Ifeoma Ajunwa and Ari
Ezra Waldman are also leading this movement in the privacy area-not simply taking
old goals of privacy into the digital realm, but exploring the new goals that must be
part of online privacy policy and law given the ways in which the digital have changed
information exchange. See generally Ari Ezra Waldman, Designing Without Privacy,
55 Hous. L. REV. 659 (2018); Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford, & Jason Schultz,
Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 CALIF. L. REv. 735 (2017).
162. See Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth
Century American Legal Thought, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 861, 863 (1981) (stating that
instrumentalism, which is "devoid of intrinsic goods," is open-ended).
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to induce the mentally ill to increase the number of times they say they
are feeling "good to well" in surveys, either talk therapy, a pill, or an
app could be a means of reaching such a goal. From a more
substantivist perspective, the process of education or mental health
care is more clearly defined. Computers have a role in both settings,
but the relationships are fundamentally defined by human-to-human
interaction-a constitutive practice in these fields.163
The instrumental viewpoint assumes that there is something
beyond embodied relationships of human beings that can account for
the purpose of institutions and relationships that are now almost
entirely carried out by or enacted by humans. This abstraction feeds
into the telos of "singularitarianism," which both predicts and
encourages the merger of person and machine into cyborg-ish hybrids,
perhaps eventually evolving into pure machine.164 We are by no means
asserting that all instrumentalists are singularitarians-rather, we are
simply noting that the mental framework of instrumentalism is more
open to such evolution of humans and societies than a more
substantivist approach.
Substantivists prioritize instead the maintenance of present
institutions and relationships and their present organic substrates. The
idea here is that there is not some completely optimized form of
humanity or society that Ellulian technique is destined to bring about
via some Darwinian process. Rather, part of our free will (both
personally and at a collective level via democratic action) is to
preserve a peaceable kingdom of more and less technologically
advanced forms of life.165
163. Frank Pasquale, Professional Judgment in an Era of Artificial
Intelligence and Machine Learning, BOUNDARY2 (forthcoming, 2019), at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3067711 ("Professionals in two
human services sectors-health care and education-have offered sustained and
extensive (if often unsuccessful) resistance to this neoliberal ideology of substitutive
automation. Each sector values certain practices, defining them as constitutive of the
field, rather than as mere means to an end.); Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not
Machines: The Limits ofLegalAutomation, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2019),
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3135549 (questioning how
far automation can replace face to face interaction in legal services).
164. See generally YUVAL NOAH HARARI, Homo DEUS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
TOMORROW (2017); RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF SPIRITUAL MACHINES: WHEN
COMPUTERS EXCEED HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (1999).
165. See, e.g., WIL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL
THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 2 (1995) (taking into the realm of varied technology
adoption, the type of concern for the preservation of diversity that is a common goal
of multiculturalist political theory, and describing varied governmental programs to
maintain the culture of minority groups).
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B. Linking the Substantive Perspective with the Digital Persona
Model
As mentioned in the Introduction, a digital persona is a concept
used to describe how our legal rights, interests and obligations are
increasingly interwoven with our real life interests. Just as we would
hope to go about our business in the real world without undue
harassment, we might expect that our online lives would be similarly
unconstrained (harkening back to the late John Perry Barlow's perhaps
overly utopic vision of cyberspace). This section links the substantive
perspective on law and technology with the digital persona model and
overviews a digital bill of rights for a digital persona. 166
A digital persona is, essentially, an avatar of a real person whose
life is interwoven with the digital world (or "digital biosphere").167 In
many ways, the digital persona represents an advance in terms of
social relationships as it can enable an individual to transcend or
escape some of the constraints that affect the non-digital lives of
individuals at a micro-level every day. Freed from these structural
constraints, the digital persona can roam, explore, and evolve, unless
the structural constraints of the non-digital impinge upon their digital
environment. As the digital biosphere evolves, these structural
constraints have become more prominent and contested. Different
stakeholders with different goals, including large technology firms,
government agencies, and even harmful individuals and groups, seek
to track us as we roam, dictate how we roam and explore, what we see,
even how we experience the online journey.
We use the term digital persona to set our model apart from
narrower views of digital identity (while recognizing similar
substantive technology perspectives have been advanced under the
narrower views).168 In privacy law, discussions of personal identity
often surround notions of control over what third parties can know
about an individual-hence, law normally seeks to regulate
information collection practices. At least in this sense, identity is
narrower than personhood, which is a construct to describe the whole
self
Personhood includes the notion that, ideally, an individual
should be able to exercise free will and freedom of choice without
166. See infra Section IV.B (linking the substantive perspective with the
digital persona model).
167. See generally Cockfield, supra note 53.
168. Our approach is, however, consistent with the tentative embrace of the
"cyborg" metaphor in Jathan Sadowski & Frank Pasquale, The Spectrum of Control:
A Social Theory of the Smart City, FIRST MONDAY (2015),
https://firstmonday.org/article/view/5903/4660 [https://perma.cc/7F5C-V5TJ].
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undue manipulation (for instance, freedom from seeing a political
effort disguised as an online news story). Under the older natural rights
view, personhood includes the moral entitlement to "one's one,"
which necessarily includes freedom of expression, thought, belief, and
conscience.169 In other words, while the older views protected interests
such as privacy, the digital persona model strives to proactively
protect autonomy. 170
Not only does treatment by third parties shape one's sense of
self, but this treatment can have discriminatory or otherwise
exclusionary substantive outcomes and provoke other political (e.g.,
antidemocratic) and social (e.g., being offered market choices based
on racially biased algorithms) outcomes.
Consistent with the substantive technology perspectives
discussed previously, Cathy O'Neil, for instance, argues that
prediction algorithms are never truly neutral, but rather reflect our
biases, prejudices and past experience.171 Timothy Wu discusses how
these algorithms are often designed to maximize online engagement
time, and track every keystroke to gather personal data that provides
clues as to our needs and desires-to better manipulate us. 172
Under the substantivist perspective, the meshing of law and
technology increasingly generates these substantive outcomes. That is,
this meshing within the virtual world ultimately determines how
individuals are treated in the real world. Hence, the digital persona
model is in the end meant to advance individual autonomy by
signaling the need for greater legal protection, particularly against
unaccountable and unseen forces that seek to manipulate us. It alerts
us to the fact that sometimes individual vulnerabilities are amplified
within the digital biosphere. These individuals can be at risk in ways
that are not apparent in the real world, including identity theft, illegal
usage of personal data, blackmail through ransomware, and so on.
The model opens our eyes to conceiving of the need for a more
holistic protection of self-directed online explorations. The model also
helps to focus attention on the fact that a digital persona is largely
constituted by two external forces: law and technology. Because we
recognize both law and technology are infused with political, social,
169. Arthur J. Cockfield, Income Taxes and Individual Liberty: A Lockean
Perspective on Radical Consumption Tax Reform, 46 S.D. L. REV. 8
(200 1)(discussing Lockean natural rights theory).
170. See generally Cockfield, supra note 137 (discussing ways to promote
autonomy in an environment of technology change).
171. See CATHY O'NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: How BIG DATA
INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 179-81 (2016).
172. See TIMOTHY Wu, ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET
INSIDE OUR HEADS 276-78 (2016).
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and cultural meaning, the framing does not limit discussion or
downplay the complexity that remains at the intersection of law and
technology. It simply acknowledges that how we are treated in the
digital world increasingly has ramifications in the real world.
The digital persona model also follows ongoing technology
trends whereby there is an ever-greater mental union between a person
and his digital analog. Notably, we may be moving closer to Gibson's
vision of cyberspace,173 where our perceptions may be dominated by
digital mediation. We may be getting glimpses of this mental meshing
as users "jack into" virtual reality platforms wearing haptic suits that
provide sensory feedback to events occurring within the online world,
a place where many of us already spend too much time.174 It raises the
possibility that individuals will increasingly lead critical portions of
their lives online, raising the risk of greater harm to an individual's
autonomy from manipulation or even mere carelessness. The digital
persona model hence suggests a greater need for constitutional, human
rights, and other protections for the digital persona-perhaps even
ultimately a digital bill of rights.
We note that, under our substantivist perspective, the digital
persona model avoids Easterbrook's worry concerning too much focus
on a particular technology, which he claimed was like studying the
law of the horse.175 Nor do we wish to affirm the cyberexceptionalism
view that the digital persona requires entirely new law. Rather, the
digital persona is a law and technology construct, reflecting an
extension of an individual's existing legal interests. Accordingly,
application of "traditional" law may suffice to protect what are after
all traditional interests, whereas new forms of law may also be needed
to counterbalance new threats to dignity and autonomy.
To achieve those aims, the following paragraphs outline a few
components of a potential digital bill of rights.
Personal Data Rights: Users often trade their personal data for
access to social media with little oversight and accountability
surrounding the usage and disclosure of this data.176 Large social
network platforms like Facebook are tied into a web of data brokers
who use sophisticated algorithms to micro-target these same users. 177
This environment seems to require strengthening privacy laws and
policies based on fair information collection practice principles such
as the European Union's new General Data Protection Regulation
173. See GIBSON, supra note 47, at 51.
174. See supra Section II.A.
175. See supra Section II.A.
176. See Wu, supra note 172, at 323.
177. See id. at 299.
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(GDPR) or Canada's Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act. Data privacy rights need to be updated to provide
users with greater perceived and actual control of their personal
information. The GDPR for instance makes it clearer that third parties
cannot access personal data unless a data subject opts in after receiving
a request written in plain language, not legalese.
Data Transparency Rights: As a digital persona travels
throughout the digital biosphere he or she needs full disclosure
concerning ways that third parties seek to sway his or her views.178
Online ads should contain a link to information such as who bought
the ad, whether the ad is connected to a political party, how much was
spent, and so on.
Algorithm Transparency Rights: Similarly, a digital persona
needs assurances his or her paths are not loaded with hidden dangers.
Governments and businesses are now deploying powerful algorithms,
often supported by artificial intelligence software such as machine
learning where only the initial parameters are set. These algorithms
sift through billions of data points per day to try to discern and
sometimes shape specific behavioral patterns, raising a host of ethical
and social issues.179 A system of rules is needed to mandate audits and
review of these algorithms to guard against downsides."so
Representative Taxation Rights: The digitization of the global
economy lets large technology companies off the tax hook, mainly
because intangible assets like brands, goodwill, patents, and
copyright, are highly mobile and can be transferred to low- or zero-tax
jurisdictions.181 Global rules need to be realigned with the challenges
presented by this new economy to ensure fair taxation in governments
where, for instance, large consumer markets enjoy taxing profits
associated with these markets.
Digital Security Rights: A digital persona needs sufficient legal
protection against outside hackers and others who are interested in
illegal or improper access to personal data.
In summary, a digital bill of rights would recognize that an
individual's digital persona is increasingly interwoven with real world
178. See Universal Guidelines for Artificial Intelligence, PUBLIC VOICE (Oct.
23, 2018), https://thepublicvoice.org/ai-universal-guidelines/
[https://perma.cc/VPH4-YLZC].
179. See O'NEIL, supra note 171.
180. See id. (discussing a promising set of principles for reviewing
algorithms).
181. See, e.g., Arthur J. Cockfield, Balancing National Interests in the
Taxation ofElectronic Commerce Business Profits, 74 TUL. L. REv. 133, 160 (1999).
See generally ARTHUR COCKFIELD ET AL., TAXING GLOBAL DIGITAL COMMERCE
(2013).
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consequences and help to promote autonomy and dignity for a user's
online experiences.
C. Cyberlaw Case Study: Free Expression Online in an Age of Bots
To understand the stakes of the contrast between
instrumentalism and substantivism, it is helpful to review debates on
the nature of robotic speech online. For instrumentalists like Eugene
Volokh, bots are simply a way of extending existing speech rights by
individuals.182 Reasoning from an example of an animatronic sculpture
that speaks, Volokh argues that "[t]he government can't restrict what
the sculpture is programmed to say . .. because the artist is endowed
with constitutional rights and the restriction would restrict the artist's
right to communicate (and the listeners' right to hear)."183 So he
justifies expansive protections for information generated using
computer algorithms. In an article refining and extending this
instrumentalist perspective, Stuart Benjamin predicts that courts will
expand the coverage of First Amendment protection to artificial
intelligence (AI), including algorithmic data processing.184
A substantivist approach is more skeptical of such reasoning,
since a massive change in quantity and speed of expression also marks
a shift in quality. As Tim Wu has observed, "[c]omputers make
trillions of invisible decisions each day; the possibility that each
decision could be protected speech should give us pause."185 He and
other scholars have forcefully argued for limiting constitutional
protection of "machine speech."186 These calls have renewed urgency
in 2018, as the weaponization of cyberspace by state and non-state
actors has become increasingly apparent. California has even required
bot disclosure to ensure that persons are not deceived by Al online.187
182. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Produced
Using Computer Algorithms, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 21, 2012),
http://volokh.com/2012/06/21/freedom-of-speech-and-information-produced-using-
computer-algorithms/ [https://perma.cc/4GQB-QS8H].
183. Id.
184. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REv.
1445, 1447 (2013). For an example of a free speech action involving artificial
intelligence, see Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 2d 561, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
185. Tim Wu, Free Speech for Computers?, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/opinion/free-speech-for-computers.html
[https://perma.cc/F4GA-RKG9]; see also Morgan Weiland, Expanding the Periphery
and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L.
REv. 1389, 1466-69 (2017).
186. Pasquale, supra note 82, at 490.
187. See David Gershgorn, A California Law Now Means Chatbots Have to
Disclose They'reNotHuman, QUARTZ (Oct. 3,2018), https://qz.com/1409350/a-new-
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Courts are divided on whether algorithmic generation of search
results and newsfeeds merits full First Amendment protection.""' The
question of bot-generated speech has not yet received sustained
judicial attention. However, it will become increasingly important.
American voters still do not know to what extent foreign governments
and non-state actors used bots to manipulate social media and search
engines during the presidential election of 2016.189 These entities are
exceptionally important gatekeepers.190 The Federal Election
Commission shirked its duty to require disclosure of the source of
much political advertising on Facebook and Twitter. Reports now
suggest that the goal of the Russian buyers of many "ads was to
amplify political discord in the U.S. and fuel an atmosphere of
divisiveness and chaos."191 Social media firms are cooperating with
investigators now. But they will likely fight proactive regulation by
arguing that their algorithmic feeds are speech. In fact, they have
already deleted critical information.192
Given the growing concern among political scientists about the
extraordinary power of secret algorithmic manipulation to target
influential messaging to persons with little to no appreciation of its
ultimate source, a substantivist approach would warn courts against
privileging algorithmic data processing as speech. As James
Grimmelmann has warned with respect to "robotic copyright," First
Amendment protection for the products of Al could systematically
law-means-californias-bots-have-to-disclose-theyre-not-human/
[https://perma.cc/X2VU-M8EU].
188. See, e.g., Oren Bracha, The Folklore of Informationalism: The Case of
Search Engine Speech, 82 FORDHAML. REV. 1629, 1631 n.8 (2014) (providing cases
pertaining to First Amendment law as applied to search engines); see also Tim Wu,
Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1513 n.82 (2013) (listing cases about First
Amendment applications to algorithmic output). See generally Ashutosh Avinash
Bhagwat, ifhen Speech Is Not "Speech ", OHIO ST. L.J. 839 (forthcoming) (providing
a broader analysis of modem First Amendment-related issues).
189. See, e.g., Pasquale, supra note 153 (compiling examples of
manipulation).
190. Frank Pasquale, Dominant Search Engines: An Essential Cultural and
Political Facility, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNET 401, 402 (2011).
191. Dylan Byers, Facebook Gives Russian-linked Ads to Congress, CNN
(Oct. 1, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/20 17/10/0 1/media/facebook-russia-ads-
congress/index.html [https://perma.cc/JR9F-7PQ3].
192. See Kieren McCarthy, Facebook, Twitter Slammedfor Deleting Evidence
of Russia's US Election Mischief REGISTER (Oct. 13, 2017),
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/10/13/facebookandtwitterslammedfordelet
ingevidence of russian election interference/ [https://perma.cc/MM2Z-Z8JY].
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favor machine over human speech.193 On only the thinnest of
instrumentalist grounds is there a recognizable continuity between the
two (as both potentially influencing or manipulating listeners or
readers). A growing body of empirical research on the troubling
effects of an "automated public sphere" suggests that bot-mediated
communication is an entirely distinct phenomenon from previous
modes of communication.194 For example, massively invasive data
profiles can make it easy to target communication toward those most
susceptible to manipulation.195
Our digital persona model leads to the same conclusion. The
model focuses on the need to promote autonomy within online
experiences.196 Computers and networks increasingly shape forms of
expression related to our digital persona. It is clear that algorithmic
speech can interfere with autonomy by manipulating or distorting
choices individuals may make.
To restore public confidence in democratic deliberation,
legislators might require rapid disclosure of the data used to generate
algorithmic speech, the algorithms employed, and the targeting of that
speech. U.S. legislation akin to the GDPR's Right to Explanation
would not infringe on, but would rather support, First Amendment
values. Affected firms may assert that their algorithms are too
complex to disclose.197 If so, governments should ban the targeting and
arrangement of information at issue, because the speech protected in
the Constitution must bear some recognizable relation to human
cognition.
From a substantivist approach, courts should not strike down
bans on subliminal advertising, or its modem-day equivalents, since
such "communication" operates outside the sphere of cognition. They
should similarly avoid intervening to protect "speech" premised on
elaborate and secretive human subjects research on Internet users.
Moreover, even if free expression protection extends to algorithmic
193. See James Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, 101 IOwA L.
REV. 657, 674 (2016).
194. See Frank Pasquale, The Automated Public Sphere, in THE POLITICS AND
POLICIES OF BIG DATA: BIG DATA, BIG BROTHER? (Ann Rudinow Satnan, Ingrid
Schneider, & Nicola Green eds., 2018); see also Frank Pasquale, Bots United,
BALKINIZATION (Feb. 14, 2012), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/02/campaign-
2020-bots-united.html [https://perma.cc/VT5F-XYH4].
195. See generally Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 995 (2014).
196. See id. at 999.
197. See id. at 1004. On the need to limit the scope and power of such
"inexplicable" artificial intelligence, see Frank Pasquale, Toward a Fourth Law of
Robotics: PreservingAttribution, Responsibility, andExplainability in an Algorithmic
Society, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2017).
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targeting, disclosure rules are essential and constitutionally sound.198
In short, context matters, and a substantivist perspective reveals the
critical distinctions between different forms of speech.
CONCLUSION
Many scholarly perspectives promote understanding of how
technology intersects with public policy and legal matters, but they
also have blind spots. Traditional research areas that fall within this
rubric include copyright, trademark, patent, telecommunications, and
mass media law. More recent research efforts include cyberlaw and
emerging efforts to more broadly examine the relationship between
law and technology.199
These areas are typically studied and evaluated as distinct legal
topics so that law and technology analysis lacks overt coherence. To
date, there are only nascent attempts to develop broader perspectives
or theories that transcend this compartmentalization, and they tend to
be dominated by instrumentalist approaches. A more balanced law and
technology approach is needed to address recurring dilemmas where
traditional approaches have been inadequate, such as the potential
need for laws to ban, inhibit, or encourage new technology, and
reducing uncertainty in the application of existing legal rules as
applied to new practices. By complementing instrumentalist cyberlaw
research with a more substantive approach, scholars are developing a
richer dialogue on the role of law and technology in general. That
richer dialogue should help inform policymakers so that they avoid
possible over- or under-inclusiveness of existing legal rules as applied
to new practices, and can help them to remedy the obsolescence of
some existing rules.
A substantivist approach helps us to understand how law and
technology analysis and prescriptions can reinforce or subvert existing
structures. Though an instrumentalism informed by economics has
dominated legal research in law and technology, the fields of
philosophy of technology, science and technology studies, and social
studies of science are now mature enough to support rival approaches
grounded in a deep understanding of the nature of, rather than results
of, technological change. These approaches are helpful in generating
198. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (resulting in an 8-1
decision to uphold disclosure provisions of BCRA); see also Frank Pasquale,
Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance Reform,
2008 ILL. L. REv. 599, 652-53 (being cited in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,
451 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
199. See infra Part II.
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insights into analytical principles or guidelines and enriching the field
of law and technology.
A substantivist perspective supports what we call the digital
persona model to signify the need for more holistic legal protection
for autonomy within the online world (or digital biosphere) as an
individual's life becomes more interwoven with technology. In
particular, a real world individual needs legal and policy assurances
that his or her online journey is not being unduly manipulated or
distorted by businesses or governments that are too frequently unseen
and unaccountable. To reduce this risk, governments should, inter
alia, pass laws to regulate and audit algorithms to detect and eliminate
problematic software code that inhibits autonomy.
